Article ID: 195522
Article Last Modified on 2/23/2004
APPLIES TO
- Microsoft SNA Server 4.0 Service Pack 1
- Microsoft SNA Server 4.0
This article was previously published under Q195522
SYMPTOMS
Single sign-on can be manipulated to disclose the password on an SSCP-LU session.
CAUSE
The 3270 single sign-on feature relies on keyword substitution in the data stream and is not completely secure. This optional feature should not be deployed in environments requiring the maximum achievable security because there is no way to guarantee that the host screen to which the keyword is directed will not echo back the clear text password to the user as though it were ordinary data.
The result is that an individual could potentially display the password by walking up to an unattended terminal, pressing the PA1 key to get an SSCP session, then type MS$SAMEP. The host will respond with an error message similar to the following:
However, if you press the PA1 key to get into SSCP-LU mode, then type MS$SAMEP on the SSCP session, SNA Server will replace the keyword, no matter how many messages have gone before on the session. Normally, SNA Server is counting the number of RUs since a Bind, and refuses to substitute the keyword with an actual password if more than a particular number RUs have gone by. For most hosts, this covers the logon sequence. The usual user experience is this:
- Log on with 3270 single sign-on.
- Get connected to an application (CICS,TSO...) and then type MS$SAMEP at an MS-DOS command line, SNA Server does not substitute in your password.
You then get a host error similar to the following:
RESOLUTION
Microsoft has confirmed this to be a problem in SNA Server versions 4.0 and 4.0 Service Pack 1. This problem was corrected in the latest SNA Server version 4.0 U.S. Service Pack. For information on obtaining this Service Pack, query on the following word in the Microsoft Knowledge Base (without the spaces):
S E R V P A C K
MORE INFORMATION
The update for this issue insures that SNA Server does not perform password keyword substitution for longer than 30 seconds (default) from the start of each LU session. This is ample time for an automated script to log on to most host applications. However, this should not be regarded as a complete solution to the security problem.
This update also entails a change from prior releases of the product in behavior of logon scripts containing MS$SAMEU and MS$SAMEP keywords. In the past, the user could log off the host application but stay connected to the SSCP session (or host session manager), then initiate a new host logon using such a script. Now, the user will have to drop the LU session from the terminal emulator (or other client application) and open a new client- server session to notify the node to resume replacing keywords.
With the update, by default, the timer will be set to 30 seconds, but you can reconfigure it in the registry using the new registry entry 3270SSOReplaceTimer.
If registry entry:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SnaServer \Parameters\3270SSOPostReplaceCountis defined, node counts this number of RUs (on PLU-SLU session only)
Else if registry entry:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SnaServer \Parameters\3270SSOReplaceTimeris defined, node uses its value (number of seconds)
- Else, if neither is defined, node uses timer algorithm with default value of 30.
As per the above algorithm, if both are defined, the count will be used rather than the timer.
Keywords: kbbug kbfix KB195522
