Article ID: 183545
Article Last Modified on 10/26/2006
APPLIES TO
- Microsoft Exchange Active Server Components 5.0
This article was previously published under Q183545
SUMMARY
When a Microsoft Internet Explorer client connects to a Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) using NTLM authentication, the browser caches the security token. All subsequent connections to the server by this client that request an NTLM response are responded to with the information that is currently cached.
Connections using Basic authentication are similar; however, only the username and password are cached. There is no checking of Windows NT credentials. When you attempt to connect to a remote mailbox during this session, authentication must be passed again; however, authentication is passed from the cache and is valid because it is only a username and password, thus allowing access.
With NTLM, the client connects to the IIS computer and gains access to the Logon.asp page by generating a hashed password and obtaining a security token. This security token is only valid for that connection to that IIS computer. When you attempt to open a remote mailbox and you are prompted for logon credentials, the browser sends the security token that was cached, which being only valid for the connection to the IIS computer itself, results in denied access.
This is called a double-hop impersonation. NTLM does not support double hop, because security tokens and hashes are only valid for the computer on which they are generated.
Keywords: kbinfo kbusage KB183545
