Microsoft KB Archive/145697

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HOWTO: Manage Trusted Domains Programmatically in Windows NT

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Q145697

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The information in this article applies to:


 * Microsoft Win32 Software Development Kit (SDK), on platform(s):
 * the operating system: Microsoft Windows NT, versions 3.51, 4.0

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SUMMARY
The ability to manage domain trust in a Windows NT environment can be accomplished by using the "Windows NT User Manager for Domains" utility (usrmgr). By choosing Trust Relationships on the Policies menu, a user can manage both sides ("Trusted Domains" and "Permitted to trust this domain") of the domain trust relationship on a domain.

This article illustrates the programmatic manipulation of the "Trusted Domains" side of the domain trust relationship, at the domain controller level. This article does not address management of "Trusted Domains" at the workstation level, which is used for managing workstation domain membership.

To understand this article, you need to understand how the domain trust relationship affects the behavior of Windows NT. It is assumed that you have this understanding.

MORE INFORMATION
The management of interdomain trust accounts ("permitted to trust this domain") is be addressed by this article. For information about managing the "permitted to trust this domain" side of the domain trust relationship, please see the following article in the Microsoft Knowledge Base:

"Q136867 HOWTO: Manage Computer Accounts Programmatically in Windows NT" You can manage trusted domains and associated passwords programmatically by using the Windows NT LSA (local security authority) API. Use the Net function call to obtain information necessary to manage trusted domains.

Considerations for Managing Trusted Domains

 * Trusted domain updates must take place on the primary domain controller for the target domain.
 * The trusted domain name should be all uppercase for consistency with Windows NT account management utilities.
 * The maximum domain name length is MAX_COMPUTERNAME_LENGTH (15).
 * The maximum trusted domain password length is LM20_PWLEN (14).
 * The password provided at trust-creation time is valid only until the trust has become active on the domain. A new password is established during trust relationship activation.
 * The user who calls the LSA trust management functions must have Administrator privilege on the target domain.
 * The Windows NT LSA API and Net function calls are currently implemented as Unicode only. The caller must ensure that strings passed to these functions are in Unicode form.
 * LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation does not verify the validity or existence of the supplied domain Sid. The caller of these API is responsible for ensuring that a valid Sid is provided to the API. You can use NetUserModalsGet at info level 2 against the domain controller for the trusted domain for this purpose.
 * Do not set TrustedPosixOffsetInformation info level with LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation. This information is managed by the LSA, so it should not be set.
 * Do not set a domain to trust itself; the trusted domain name should not match the domain name where the policy update takes place.

List of APIs That Can Be Used to Manage Trusted Domains
NetGetDCName can be used to obtain the computer name of the primary domain controller associated with a domain name.

NetUserModalsGet at info level 2 can be used to obtain the Sid representing the trusted domain, in addition to the domain name of the specified computer. The target machine is a domain controller for the trusted domain. The resultant domain Sid is supplied to LSA API calls that require the Domain Sid of the trusted domain to manage.

NetServerGetInfo at info level 101 can be used to determine if the target of the policy object update is a domain controller or a workstation. This article does not address the workstation case, so this determination is necessary.

NetApiBufferFree is used to free buffers allocated by Net function calls that return information.

LsaOpenPolicy is used to open the policy object on the computer where the trusted domain update is taking place. The target computer is a primary domain controller.

LsaDeleteTrustedDomain is used to delete a trusted domain.

LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo at info level TrustedPasswordInformation is used to determine if the trusted domain object already exists, and if so, what the current Password is.

LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation at info level TrustedDomainNameInformation is used to create the trusted domain object if the object does not yet exist.

LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation at info level TrustedPasswordInformation is used to set the new password associated with the trusted domain object. If the specified trust existed after the call to LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo, set the OldPassword on the trusted domain object to the previous password obtained from the Query operation.

LsaFreeMemory should be used if memory was allocated by the LSA for the caller. An example of this is data provided by LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo.

LsaCloseHandle is used to close an open policy handle when it is no longer needed.

Steps to Verify That the Trust Exists
Prior to creating a new trusted domain, it may be useful to verify that the "permitted to trust this domain" side of the trust relationship exists and is consistent with the new trusted domain. If the trust does not exist or is inconsistent, the user could be alerted to take action in order to complete the trust relationship.

The trust can be verified by attempting to establish a connection to the trusted domain and specifying a username, domain name, and password corresponding to the trust account and trusted domain password. The following steps should be used to verify the trust:

 Obtain the domain controller computer name for the trusted domain by calling NetGetDCName. This domain name is also used as the domain name associated with the trust account.  Build a UNC path containing the trusted domain computer name and the Interprocess communication share. An example UNC path is: "\\WINBASE\IPC$"  Build a user name consisting of the domain name, which is "permitted to trust," with a "$" appended. An example user name is: "MYDOMAIN$" Call NetUseAdd at info level 2 to specify the domain name, UNC path, user name, and password associated with the trust.

If the trust is successfully verified, the connection attempt fails with ERROR_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT. In this case, the supplied credentials were validated, but the account type does not allow a network style logon.

If NetUseAdd succeeds with NERR_Success, the specified trust account does not exist, because the specified account does not exist on the target computer, and default credentials were used to establish the connection. Use NetUseDel to delete the connection.

If NetUseAdd fails with ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE, the supplied password does not match the password on the trust account.

If NetUseAdd fails with ERROR_SESSION_CREDENTIAL_CONFLICT, a connection already exists to the specified domain controller, which uses credentials that differ from the credentials supplied with NetUseAdd. The existing connection must be deleted to verify the trust.

NOTE: This method of trust verification is advisory and may be specific to versions of Windows NT versions 3.1 through 4.0.

Sample Code
  /*++

This sample illustrates how to manage Windows NT trusted domains at the domain controller level.

The first command line argument indicates the name of the new or   existing trusted domain to create or modify.

The second command line argument indicates the new password for the trusted domain specified in the first argument.

The optional third argument indicates the domain name that is the target of the trusted domain update operation. If this argument is not specified, the update will occur on the local domain. Note that this sample will not allow a trusted domain update to occur on a non-domain controller.

This sample requires header files found on the Windows NT 3.51 SDK CD-ROM compact disc in the \Mstools\Security directory.

This sample works correctly compiled ANSI or Unicode. Note that Net function calls are Unicode only, and Windows NT LSA API are Unicode only.

The following import libraries are required:

Netapi32.lib Advapi32.lib

--*/

#ifndef UNICODE #define UNICODE #define _UNICODE #endif

#include   #include          // for NetXxx API #include "ntsecapi.h"  // \mstools\samples\win32\winnt\security\include\ntsecapi.h

#include 

#define RTN_OK 0 #define RTN_USAGE 1 #define RTN_ERROR 13

//   // if you have the DDK, include Ntstatus.h   // #ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS #define STATUS_SUCCESS                 ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L) #define STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND   ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000034L) #define STATUS_INVALID_SID             ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000078L) #endif

void InitLsaString(      PLSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaString,       LPWSTR String       );

NTSTATUS OpenPolicy(      LPWSTR ServerName,       DWORD DesiredAccess,       PLSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle       );

BOOL GetDomainSid(      LPWSTR DomainName,  // domain name to acquire Sid of       PSID *pDomainSid    // points to allocated Sid on success       );

NTSTATUS SetTrustedDomainInfo(      LSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle,       PSID DomainSid,             // Sid of domain to manipulate       LPWSTR TrustedDomainName,   // trusted domain name to add/update       LPWSTR Password             // new trust password for trusted domain       );

BOOL VerifyTrustRelationship(      LPWSTR TargetDomainName,        // domain name to verify trust at       LPWSTR TrustAccountToVerify,    // trusted domain name to verify       LPWSTR Password,                // password associated with trust       LPBOOL bTrustVerified           // indicates if trust was verified       );

void DisplayNtStatus(      LPSTR szAPI,    // ANSI string containing API name       NTSTATUS Status       );

void DisplayError(      LPSTR szAPI,    // pointer to failed API name       DWORD dwLastError       );

//   // Unicode entry point and argv //   int __cdecl wmain(      int argc,       wchar_t *argv[]       ) {      BOOL bAllocTargetDomain;    // did you allocate memory for target? LSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle; LPWSTR TargetDomainName;   // target domain of policy update LPWSTR DomainController;   // computer name where policy update PSID DomainSid; // allocated Sid representing domain to trust LPWSTR TrustedDomainName; LPWSTR Password; BOOL bTrustVerified; NET_API_STATUS nas; NTSTATUS Status;

if(argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr,              "Usage: %ls   [TargetDomain]\n",               argv[0]); return RTN_USAGE; }

TrustedDomainName = argv[1];   // existing or new TrustedDomain Password = argv[2];            // new password for TrustedDomain

//       // if a TargetDomain was specified, point to that. // if not, set TargetDomain to the current domain if a DC. //       if(argc == 4 && *argv[3] != L'\0') { TargetDomainName = argv[3]; // domain to update trust at          bAllocTargetDomain = FALSE; // no memory allocated }      else { PSERVER_INFO_101 si101; DWORD Type; PUSER_MODALS_INFO_2 umi2;

//           // ensure that the local computer is a DC. This operation is          // only appropriate against a domain controller. //           nas = NetServerGetInfo(NULL, 101, (LPBYTE *)&si101); if(nas != NERR_Success) { DisplayError("NetServerGetInfo", nas); return RTN_ERROR; }

Type = si101->sv101_type; NetApiBufferFree(si101);

if( !(Type & SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL) &&              !(Type & SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL) ) { printf("Error: Specify a TargetDomain; this operation"                       " is only valid against a domain.\n"); return RTN_ERROR; }

//           // obtain the local computer's domain name //           nas = NetUserModalsGet(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE *)&umi2);

if(nas != NERR_Success) { DisplayError("NetUserModalsGet", nas); return RTN_ERROR; }

//           // copy the domain name to new storage //           TargetDomainName = (LPWSTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap, 0,               (lstrlenW(umi2->usrmod2_domain_name) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));

if(TargetDomainName != NULL) { lstrcpyW(TargetDomainName, umi2->usrmod2_domain_name); bAllocTargetDomain = TRUE; // we allocated memory }

NetApiBufferFree(umi2); // free memory allocated by NetXxx

//           // if an error occurred allocating memory, exit //           if(TargetDomainName == NULL) { DisplayError("HeapAlloc", 0); return RTN_ERROR; }      }

//       // do not allow a Domain to trust itself //       if(lstrcmpiW(TargetDomainName, TrustedDomainName) == 0) { fprintf(stderr,"Error: Domain %ls cannot trust itself.\n",               TargetDomainName);

return RTN_ERROR; }

//       // ensure Password and TrustedDomainName are the correct length //       if(lstrlenW(Password) > LM20_PWLEN) Password[LM20_PWLEN] = L'\0'; // truncate

if(lstrlenW(TrustedDomainName) > MAX_COMPUTERNAME_LENGTH) TrustedDomainName[MAX_COMPUTERNAME_LENGTH] = L'\0'; // truncate

//       // obtain the primary DC computer name from the specified // TargetDomainName //       nas = NetGetDCName(           NULL, TargetDomainName, (LPBYTE *)&DomainController);

if(nas != NERR_Success) { DisplayError("NetGetDCName", nas); return RTN_ERROR; }

//       // verify the trust relationship //       if(!VerifyTrustRelationship( TrustedDomainName, TargetDomainName,  // trust account to verify Password, &bTrustVerified )) {          //            // an error occurred during trust relationship verification //           DisplayError("VerifyTrustRelationship", GetLastError); }      else { //           // inform the user if the trust was not verified //           if(!bTrustVerified) { DWORD dwTrustVerifyFailReason = GetLastError;

//               // You could exit here, but this is optional. Reasons for // trust verification failure could be non-existent // "permitted to trust" on the verified domain (rc=1317), // wrong password (rc=1326), etc //               printf("Warning:  ");

switch(dwTrustVerifyFailReason) { case ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER: printf("%ls not permitted-to-trust on %ls\n",                          TargetDomainName, TrustedDomainName); break;

case ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE: printf("Trust %ls has incorrect password on %ls\n",                          TrustedDomainName, TargetDomainName); break;

default: DisplayError("Trust was not verified. Non-fatal",                           dwTrustVerifyFailReason); } // switch }      }

//       // fetch the DomainSid of the domain to trust //       if(!GetDomainSid(TrustedDomainName, &DomainSid)) { DisplayError("GetDomainSid", GetLastError); return RTN_ERROR; }

//       // open the policy on the target domain //       Status = OpenPolicy(                   DomainController,                   POLICY_CREATE_SECRET |  // for password set operation                   POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN,     // for trust creation                   &PolicyHandle                   );

if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) { DisplayNtStatus("OpenPolicy", Status); return RTN_ERROR; }

//       // Update TrustedDomainInfo to reflect the specified trust. //       Status = SetTrustedDomainInfo(           PolicyHandle,           DomainSid,           TrustedDomainName,           Password           );

if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) { DisplayNtStatus("SetTrustedDomainInfo", Status); return RTN_ERROR; }

//       // if you allocated memory for TargetDomainName, free it       // if(bAllocTargetDomain) HeapFree(GetProcessHeap, 0, TargetDomainName);

//       // free the Sid which was allocated for the TrustedDomain Sid //       FreeSid(DomainSid);

//       // close the policy handle //       LsaClose(PolicyHandle);

if(DomainController != NULL) NetApiBufferFree(DomainController);

return RTN_OK; }

void InitLsaString(      PLSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaString,       LPWSTR String       ) {      DWORD StringLength;

if(String == NULL) { LsaString->Buffer = NULL; LsaString->Length = 0; LsaString->MaximumLength = 0;

return; }

StringLength = lstrlenW(String); LsaString->Buffer = String; LsaString->Length = (USHORT) StringLength * sizeof(WCHAR); LsaString->MaximumLength = (USHORT) (StringLength + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR); }

NTSTATUS OpenPolicy(      LPWSTR ServerName,       DWORD DesiredAccess,       PLSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle       ) {      LSA_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes; LSA_UNICODE_STRING ServerString; PLSA_UNICODE_STRING Server = NULL;

//       // Always initialize the object attributes to all zeroes //       ZeroMemory(&ObjectAttributes, sizeof(ObjectAttributes));

if(ServerName != NULL) { //           // Make a LSA_UNICODE_STRING out of the LPWSTR passed in           // InitLsaString(&ServerString, ServerName);

Server = &ServerString; }

//       // Attempt to open the policy //       return LsaOpenPolicy(                   Server,                   &ObjectAttributes,                   DesiredAccess,                   PolicyHandle                   ); }

/*++   This function retrieves the Sid representing the specified DomainName.

If the function succeeds, the return value is TRUE and pDomainSid will point to the Sid representing the specified DomainName. The caller should free the memory associated with this Sid with the Win32 API FreeSid when the Sid is no longer needed.

If the function fails, the return value is FALSE, and pDomainSid will be set to NULL.

--*/

BOOL GetDomainSid(      LPWSTR DomainName,  // domain name to acquire Sid of       PSID *pDomainSid    // points to allocated Sid on success       ) {      NET_API_STATUS nas; LPWSTR DomainController; PUSER_MODALS_INFO_2 umi2 = NULL; DWORD dwSidSize; BOOL bSuccess = FALSE; // assume this function will fail

*pDomainSid = NULL; // invalidate pointer

//       // obtain the PDC computer name of the supplied domain name //       nas = NetGetDCName(NULL, DomainName, (LPBYTE *)&DomainController); if(nas != NERR_Success) { SetLastError(nas); return FALSE; }

__try {

//       // obtain the domain Sid from the PDC // NOTE: this may fail if the credentials of the caller are not // recognized or valid on the target computer. In this case, it      // is necessary to first establish a connection via NetUseAdd // at info-level 2 to the remote IPC$, specifying EMPTY // credentials. //       nas = NetUserModalsGet(DomainController, 2, (LPBYTE *)&umi2); if(nas != NERR_Success) __leave;

//       // if the Sid is valid, obtain the size of the Sid //       if(!IsValidSid(umi2->usrmod2_domain_id)) __leave; dwSidSize = GetLengthSid(umi2->usrmod2_domain_id);

//       // allocate storage and copy the Sid //       *pDomainSid = (PSID)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap, 0, dwSidSize); if(*pDomainSid == NULL) __leave;

if(!CopySid(dwSidSize, *pDomainSid, umi2->usrmod2_domain_id)) __leave;

bSuccess = TRUE; // indicate success

} // try __finally {

//       // free allocated memory //       NetApiBufferFree(DomainController);

if(umi2 != NULL) NetApiBufferFree(umi2);

if(!bSuccess) { //           // if the function failed, free memory and indicate result code //

if(*pDomainSid != NULL) { FreeSid(*pDomainSid); *pDomainSid = NULL; }

if(nas != NERR_Success) { SetLastError(nas); }      }

}      return bSuccess; }

/*++   This function manipulates the trust associated with the supplied DomainSid.

If the domain trust does not exist, it is created with the specified password. In this case, the supplied PolicyHandle must have been opened with POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN and POLICY_CREATE_SECRET access to the policy object.

If the domain trust exists, the password is updated with the password specified by the Password parameter. The trust OldPassword is set to the previous password.

If DomainName and Password are NULL, the trusted domain specified by   DomainSid is deleted.

--*/

NTSTATUS SetTrustedDomainInfo(      LSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle,       PSID DomainSid,             // Sid of domain to manipulate       LPWSTR TrustedDomainName,   // trusted domain name to add/update       LPWSTR Password             // new trust password for trusted domain       ) {      PTRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO tpi; PTRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO tdni; LSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaPassword; TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO Newtpi; BOOL bTrustExists = TRUE; // assume trust exists NTSTATUS Status;

//       // Make sure you were passed a valid Sid //       if(DomainSid == NULL || !IsValidSid(DomainSid)) return STATUS_INVALID_SID;

//       // if TrustedDomainName and Password is NULL (or empty strings), // delete the specified trust //       if( (TrustedDomainName == NULL || *TrustedDomainName == L'\0') &&           (Password == NULL || *Password == L'\0') ) { return LsaDeleteTrustedDomain(PolicyHandle, DomainSid); }

//       // query the current password, which is used to update the // OldPassword. If the trust doesn't exist, indicate this so that // the trust will be created. //       Status = LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo(           PolicyHandle,           DomainSid,           TrustedPasswordInformation,           &tpi);

if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) { if(Status == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND) { bTrustExists = FALSE; // indicate trust does not exist }          else { DisplayNtStatus("LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo", Status); return Status; }      }

InitLsaString(&LsaPassword, Password);

//       // set the new password to the supplied password //       Newtpi.Password = LsaPassword;

if(bTrustExists) { //           // if the trust already existed, set OldPassword to the // current password... //           Newtpi.OldPassword = tpi->Password; }      else { LSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaDomainName; DWORD cchDomainName; // number of chars in TrustedDomainName

//           // if the trust did not exist, set OldPassword to the // supplied password... //           Newtpi.OldPassword = LsaPassword;

InitLsaString(&LsaDomainName, TrustedDomainName);

//           // ...convert TrustedDomainName to uppercase... //           cchDomainName = LsaDomainName.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); while(cchDomainName--) { LsaDomainName.Buffer[cchDomainName] = towupper(LsaDomainName.Buffer[cchDomainName]); }

//           // ...create the trusted domain object //           Status = LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation(               PolicyHandle,               DomainSid,               TrustedDomainNameInformation,               &LsaDomainName               );

if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) return Status; }

//       // update TrustedPasswordInformation for the specified trust //       Status = LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation(           PolicyHandle,           DomainSid,           TrustedPasswordInformation,           &Newtpi           );

//       // if a trust already existed, free the memory associated with // the retrieved information //       if(bTrustExists) LsaFreeMemory(tpi);

return Status; }

/*++

This function verifies that the "permitted to trust" side of the trust relationship has been established and that the specified password matches the "permitted to trust" password.

If the function fails, the return value is FALSE, and bTrustVerified is undefined.

If the function succeeds, the trust verification succeeded, and bTrustVerified is set to the result of the verification.

If bTrustVerified is TRUE, the trust relationship is verified.

If bTrustVerified is FALSE, the trust was not verified. Call GetLastError to get extended error information.

ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER indicates that the "permitted to trust" UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT does not exist on the specified domain.

ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE indicates that the supplied password does not match the password in the "permitted to trust" UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT.

NOTE: if a connection exists to the domain controller of the TargetDomainName prior to calling this function, this function will fail due to a credential conflict (WinError == 1219).

--*/

BOOL VerifyTrustRelationship(      LPWSTR TargetDomainName,        // domain name to verify trust at       LPWSTR TrustAccountToVerify,    // trusted domain name to verify       LPWSTR Password,                // password associated with trust       LPBOOL bTrustVerified           // indicates if trust was verified       ) {      NET_API_STATUS nas; USE_INFO_2 ui2; LPWSTR DomainController; LPWSTR szIpc = L"\\IPC$"; LPWSTR RemoteResource = NULL; LPWSTR UserName = NULL; BOOL bSuccess = FALSE; // assume this function will fail

//       // fetch the computer name of the domain you try to connect to       // nas = NetGetDCName(          NULL, TargetDomainName, (LPBYTE *)&DomainController); if(nas != NERR_Success) { SetLastError(nas); return FALSE; }

__try {

//       // build the \\<DCName>\ipc$ as the remote resource //       RemoteResource = (LPWSTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap, 0,           (lstrlenW(DomainController) + lstrlenW(szIpc) + 1 ) *               sizeof(WCHAR)           );

if(RemoteResource == NULL) __leave;

if(lstrcpyW(RemoteResource, DomainController) == NULL) __leave; if(lstrcatW(RemoteResource, szIpc) == NULL) __leave;

//       // build the user name as <TrustAccountToVerify>$ //       UserName = (LPWSTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap, 0,           (lstrlenW(TrustAccountToVerify) + 1 + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR)           );

if(UserName == NULL) __leave;

if(lstrcpyW(UserName, TrustAccountToVerify) == NULL) __leave; if(lstrcatW(UserName, L"$") == NULL) __leave;

ZeroMemory(&ui2, sizeof(ui2));

ui2.ui2_local = NULL; ui2.ui2_remote = RemoteResource; ui2.ui2_asg_type = USE_IPC; ui2.ui2_password = Password; ui2.ui2_username = UserName; ui2.ui2_domainname = TargetDomainName;

//       // Attempt to establish a connection to the target domain. // If the result is ERROR_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT, // this illustrates the supplied Password matches an existing // trust account because the credentials were validated but // a logon is not allowed for this account type. //       nas = NetUseAdd(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE)&ui2, NULL);

if(nas == ERROR_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { *bTrustVerified = TRUE;    // indicate trust verified }      else { *bTrustVerified = FALSE;   // indicate trust not verified

//           // if the connection succeeded, the UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT // does not exist, because the supplied credentials aren't          // recognized by the remote (default credentials are applied). // Delete the connection and indicate the "permitted to trust" // account is non-existent. //           if(nas == NERR_Success) { NetUseDel(NULL, RemoteResource, 0); nas = ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER; }      }

bSuccess = TRUE; // indicate this function succeeded

} // try __finally {

//       // free allocated memory //       NetApiBufferFree(DomainController);

if(RemoteResource != NULL) { HeapFree(GetProcessHeap, 0, RemoteResource); }

if(UserName != NULL) { HeapFree(GetProcessHeap, 0, UserName); }

//       // if you succeeded, but trust could not be verified, indicate why //       if(bSuccess == TRUE && *bTrustVerified == FALSE) { SetLastError(nas); }

}

return bSuccess; }

void DisplayNtStatus(      LPSTR szAPI,    // ANSI string containing API name       NTSTATUS Status       ) {      //        // convert the NTSTATUS to Winerror and display the result //       DisplayError(szAPI, LsaNtStatusToWinError(Status)); }

void DisplayError(      LPSTR szAPI, // pointer to failed API name       DWORD dwLastError       ) {      LPSTR MessageBuffer; DWORD dwBufferLength;

fprintf(stderr,"%s error! (rc=%lu)\n", szAPI, dwLastError);

if(dwBufferLength=FormatMessageA( FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER | FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, dwLastError, GetUserDefaultLangID, (LPSTR) &MessageBuffer, 0,          NULL ))      {           DWORD dwBytesWritten;

//           // Output message string on stderr //           WriteFile(               GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE),               MessageBuffer,               dwBufferLength,               &dwBytesWritten,               NULL               );

//           // free the buffer allocated by the system //           LocalFree(MessageBuffer); }  } Additional query words: lsa machine account server workstation trust

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